Most of the empirical literature on the relative merits of alternative exchange rate regimes uses the IMF de jure classification based on the regime that governments claim to have, abstracting from the fact that many countries that in theory follow flexible regimes intervene in the exchange market to an extent that in practice makes them indistinguishable from fixed rate regimes, and vice versa. To address this problem, in this paper we construct a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes. Using cluster analysis techniques, we group different regimes according to their behavior along three classification dimensions: the nominal exchange rate, changes in the nominal exchange rate, and international reserves. We compare our results with the IMF classification, and discuss the main discrepancies. The paper provides an exchange rate classification for each country and each year during the period 1990-1998 which is readily available for downloading at
Motivation
The proper assessment of costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate regimes has been a hotly debated issue. Most of the literature has concentrated either in the tradeoff between monetary independence and credibility implied by different exchange rate regimes, or on the insulation properties of each arrangement in the face of monetary and real shocks. However, recent episodes of financial distress have led to renewed interest on the topic, by introducing the question of which exchange rate regime is better suited to deal with increasingly global and unstable world capital markets. Recent contributions on the issue include Eichengreen (1994) , Calvo (1999) , Frankel (1999) , Rose (1999) and Larraín and Velasco (1999) .
In this paper, we argue that most of the research in this area has been misguided. Not in the questions that it has asked, which are important and relevant, but in the way the literature has, so far, classified exchange rate regimes. It has been common practice in this literature to classify exchange rate regimes by the de jure (legal) regime as compiled by the IMF, i.e., according to the regime the country declares to be running. 2 In turn, this classification has been the standard regime index used in econometric work.
We believe that this procedure is misleading. There are countries that in theory have a flexible rate but for whom intervention in exchange markets is so pervasive that in practice very little difference exists (in terms of either policy or observable outcomes) with countries that have explicit fixed exchange rate regimes. Conversely, inflation prone countries usually have unsustainable fixed exchange rates. Periodic devaluations are therefore the result of the implementation of monetary policies that are inconsistent with fixing the exchange rate and that make the effective regime more similar to a flexible arrangement. Moreover, countries that appear to behave according to the declared regime during tranquil times may be tempted to change their course of action once the regime is under stress.
All this implies that, for the purpose of studying the impact of different exchange rate regimes, a new classification is required to capture the true differences in actual policies that are not properly taken into account by the legal definition. Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) pursue this idea when they examine the impact of exchange rate regimes on fiscal performance, inflation and real variables, going beyond a simple de jure classification of exchange rate regimes.
3 Frieden et al. (1998) also modify the standard IFS classification in order to account for frequent adjusters and for different types of crawls.
While similar in spirit to our research, this work does not account for different degrees of intervention under flexible regimes and, more importantly, they stop short of constructing a usable classification index. Similarly, this work underscores that there is no agreement even on the number of exchange rate regimes that should be considered.
As will be seen below our methodology allows to use the data to make a statement on the number of regimes which can be distinguished from the data.
In this paper, we intend to cover this needed methodological step, proposing one such index to be used in future research. More precisely, we group different exchange rate regimes according to the behavior of three classification variables: the nominal exchange rate, the change of the nominal exchange rate, and international reserves. Underlying the selection of this variables is the idea that a textbook definition of exchange rate regimes would associate fixed exchange rate regimes with high volatility in international reserves coupled with little volatility in the nominal exchange rate. On the contrary, flexible regimes would exhibit substantial volatility in nominal rates with relatively little volatility in reserves. Thus, the different behavior in each of these variables should be sufficient to determine the regime to which each country corresponds.
In order to make such classification we use a cluster analysis methodology which sorts the cases into a given number of groups according to the characteristics for the three variables of reference. We apply the classification procedure twice. As in the first round, the algorithm groups a substantial number of countries in a cluster characterized by a small variability along all dimensions, we repeat the classification procedure only for countries belonging to this low variability cluster, to acknowledge the existence of distinct regimes within this group. We think that the distinction between high and low variability countries could be potentially very useful. By introducing this variability dimension, this new methodology has the advantage that it allows to incorporate to the econometric analysis the intensity of the shocks to which the regime is subject, something that qualitative indexes previously used did not allow for. This may turn out to be relevant for the empirical analysis as a way of testing whether the policy response under different exchange rate regimes, and their impact on other variables, depends on the relative magnitude of underlying shocks. As is discussed below, the intensity dimension is also important to avoid the usual bias towards the irrelevance hypothesis, particularly likely if the effect of the regime on other variables is significant only at high volatility levels.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data, the construction of the variables, and the exchange rate classification procedure. Section 3 provides the classification results and compares them with the IMF classification. Finally, Section 4 discusses further empirical work and concludes.
Methodology

Classification variables
Our classification is based on three variables closely related to exchange rate behavior. Exchange rate volatility (ME) is measured as the average of the absolute monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate during the year. Volatility of exchange rate changes (DE) is measured as the standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate. For both of these variables it was necessary to establish a currency of reference. For this we chose the legal peg currency or, in the case of managed floats, the currency to which the exchange rate exhibited the least volatility from among the major currencies. 4 Countries which pegged their currency to a basket were eliminated from the sample unless the basket weights were known and the central peg parity could be computed. The reference currency for each country is presented in Appendix 1.
The third classification variable, volatility of reserves (MR) is measured as the average of the absolute monthly change in international reserves relative to the monetary base in the previous month in order to proxy the monetary impact of these changes. More precisely, we subtract government deposits at the central bank from the central bank's net foreign assets and divide its monthly change by the monetary base lagged one month.
5 External liabilities had to be eliminated in order to consider only international reserves with a counterpart in monetary aggregates. In turn, changes in government deposits have to be netted out to correct for variations in international reserves that do not lead to changes in base money. 6 The data computes a yearly figure for each classification variable for all countries that reported in the IFS. The period of analysis is 1990-1998. 7 A summary of the database is presented in Figures 1 through 3 , which show the histograms for the three variables.
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The distribution of both exchange rate variables, ME and DE, (resp. Figures 1 and 2 ), are highly skewed to the left. In the first case, for example, more than 350 cases out of a total sample of 955 (each case representing an annual figure for a given country) exhibit no change in the nominal exchange rate, and the number of cases decreases as the monthly devaluation increases. As expected, the same pattern is valid for the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, with the mode corresponding to fix rate regimes. Figure 3 shows the variability for international reserves relative to the monetary base. Here relatively fewer observations correspond to the case of a low monthly change with the mode indicating an average monthly fluctuation in international reserves of about 5% of the monetary base. The curve still shows substantial skewness indicating that most countries exhibit a volatility of between 0 and 5% in its international reserves.
Exchange Rate Regimes
According to the three classification variables described above, a priori we expect different regimes to exhibit the following patterns: 4 The US dollar, the French franc, the German marc, the British pound, and the Japanese yen were considered. All data are from the IFS. 5 We use line 11 from the IFS, net of lines 16c and 16d, and divide its change by line 14 (or 14a if line 14 was not available) lagged one month. 6 Oil producing countries and countries with important privatization programs are examples of cases where the latter correction matters. 7 The complete database is available at http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen or http://www.utdt.edu/~ely. 8 For expositional purposes, the charts leave out the upper tails of the histograms. Finally, countries that do not display significant variability in either variable are grouped in a class that we denote "inconclusive". The wording is not arbitrary since, given the magnitude of the changes involved, the experience of these countries should not tell us much about the specific impact of the type of regime on the behavior of the economy. The underlying hypothesis is that the exchange rate regime has an impact on economic performance only when the variables that distinguish the different regimes show discernible different patterns. If so, the inclusion of "inconclusive" cases on the right hand side of standard econometric tests would bias the results in favor of the hypothesis that exchange rate regimes have no significant bearing on other variables.
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Cluster analysis
Once the three classification measures are computed for our universe of countries, we use cluster analysis as a way of assigning countries to different groups. We consider each cluster as representing a distinct exchange rate regime, independently of the "legal" regime stated by the country that is assigned to this group.
Cluster analysis is a technique used to identify homogeneous groups or clusters. 11 While the standard discriminant analysis starts from a known classification of the sample to derive a classification rule to be applied to out-of-sample cases, cluster analysis has the advantage that it does not need to know in advance the type of regime we are facing but rather works in the opposite direction, constructing groups according to similarities (distances) between the sample elements measured over (in our case) the three dimensional space defined by the classification variables previously described.
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HC), typically used for small samples, allows for a discretionality on the part of the researcher in determining the way distances are measured, in the order the sample is introduced and in how the classification itself is realized. In general, methods for defining clusters fall into three groups: linkage methods, error sums of squares, or variance methods. All of them start from a matrix of distances between pairs of elements, and differ in how they estimate distances between clusters at successive steps. Thus, in the nearest neighbor method (single linkage) the first two cases combined are those with the smallest distance between them. The distance between the new cluster and other individual cases is then computed as the minimum distance between an individual case and a case in the cluster. At every step, the distance between two clusters is taken to be the distance between their two closest points. We can describe along similar lines other variants like the complete linkage (furthest neighbor), the average linkage, or the centroid methods.
Alternatively, in K-Means Cluster Analysis (KMC), based on nearest centroid sorting (Andergerg, 1973) , a case is assigned to the cluster with the smallest distance between the case and the center of the cluster (centroid). The number of clusters is specified exante by the user, and cluster centers are iteratively estimated from the data. This method requires the least intervention from the researcher. Since it is crucial to our work that the resulting classification should be as candid as possible, with minimum manipulation of the classification criteria, we choose KMC as our classification method.
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However, because KMC relies on a measure of the distance between points it is important that measures be comparable in order to obtain a relevant classification along all dimensions. In order to achieve this we z-normalize all variables by using deviations to the mean divided by the standard deviation. Prior to this normalization we eliminate the 1 percent-upper tail of observations for each of the three dimensions, which entailed leaving 22 observations out from a sample. 13 11 The most common examples of the use of this technique come from the areas in which it is most frequently used: numerical taxonomy of animals and plants (biology), distinct pathological groups (medicine), people with similar buying habits (marketing), etc. 12 We use SPSS 8.0 as our computational device. The algorithm for the K-means classification proceeds as follows: "The first k cases in the data file, where k is the number of clusters requested, are selected as temporary centers. As subsequent cases are processed, a case replaces a center if the smallest distance to a center is greater than the distance between the two closest centers. The center that is closer to the case is replaced. A case also replaces a center if the smallest distance from the case to a center is larger than the smallest distance between the center and all other centers. Again, it replaces the center closest to it" (Norusis, 1993) . 13 Because these outliers do not present classification problems, we re-classify these observations ex-post. The procedure for their classification was to classify them around the centroids obtained from the classification of all the remaining data. In short, this procedure is equivalent to assigning these observations to the cluster with the nearest centroid. In the tables, countries classified according to this criterion are denoted by the indicator (3).
Exchange Rate Regime Classification
In order to provide the starkest version of our analysis we proceed in the following fashion. After eliminating all yearly observations for which one of the variables was unavailable, and after eliminating outliers and normalizing we use the K-means procedure to classify countries into the 5 clusters described in Table 1 . We call this first pass at the data the 1 st round classification.
In general this initial classification allocates a high proportion of countries within the "inconclusive" category. As discussed in the introduction, identifying separately these countries should be useful information for empirical work, as it singles out those countries where shocks did not require significant adjustments in either the nominal exchange rate or reserves.
However, this group contains countries with very well defined exchange rate regimes. While variations may be small, countries within this group can exhibit no change in the nominal exchange rate, with active (albeit small) change in international reserves, corresponding to the fixed rate group. Similarly, countries may show no volatility in international reserves and small but positive volatility in the nominal exchange rate. These countries should be classified as floats.
In order to recover this potentially useful information, while distinguishing at the same time high and low variability cases, we reclassify the "inconclusive" cases using the same methodology as before. That is, we re-normalize the data for these cases, and apply the K-means procedure on the normalized values, again allowing for five groups.
We call this analysis of the "inconclusive" sub-group the 2 nd round classification. In general the two-round procedure assigns an exchange rate regime to most countries in the sample, i.e. the "inconclusive" from the 2 nd round classification are relatively few.
14 The classification methodology is summarized in Figure 4 and the main results of the classification are presented in Tables 2 through 4 . Appendix 2 shows the classification results for each country and year, to be used as input in empirical work. 15 Table 2 shows the upper and lower bounds of the three underlying variables for the 1 st and 2 nd round classifications, and confirm that the identified groups span the data as expected.
For the 1 st round classification several interesting results are evident from the numbers. First, fixed and floating exchange rate regimes clearly diverge in the behavior of international reserves. Whereas floating rates exhibit changes in reserves that oscillate between 0.1% and 13% on average, the equivalent range for fixed rates goes from 12.4% to 41.8%. While there are some dirties which exhibit low intervention in foreign exchange markets, these cases are in general associated with much larger fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. The evidence seems to make the following important point: Pure floats appear to tolerate relatively minor fluctuations in the exchange rate. As a rule, countries with substantial movements in the nominal exchange rate usually intervene actively in exchange rate markets.
Regarding the variability in the nominal exchange rate, the group of countries considered to have a pure float includes average monthly devaluation rates which range between 1.1% and 4.9% whereas countries classified in the fixed exchange rate regime includes pure fixes as well as cases with changes in the nominal exchange rate that go as far as 4.5%.
In the 2 nd round classification the grouping becomes more dichotomous between the fixers and the floats. While fixers exhibit a volatility of the nominal exchange rate that goes from zero to 0.3%, floaters exhibit a volatility that ranges between 0.5% and 1.4%. On the reserves dimension, floaters have an intervention rate between 0.1% and 5.4% of base money, whereas for fixers the minimum average intervention is 5.7%. Within the 2 nd round classification there is no clear distinction between the two types of intermediate regimes (managed floats).
The relative frequency of each regime is presented in Table 3 . The table shows that, based on the final, two-round, classification, cases are evenly distributed between floaters and fixers, with an equivalent number of cases in the managed floating group. This result arises from a larger participation of floaters in the 1 st round classification and a larger number of fixers among the 2 nd round classification. As the latter cases correspond to countries which are not subject to substantial volatility in international capital markets this result could be indicating that as volatility increases most countries (are forced to) edge towards floating their exchange rates. Conversely, inverting the direction of causality, this finding may interpreted as suggesting that fix exchange rate regimes are more often associated with greater stability. 16 The fact that cluster centroids are determined from observations spanning nine years of data implicitly fixes the regime characteristic (coordinates) over the period, and use them as a time-invariant benchmark against which to compare observations belonging to particular years. Thus, one should expect different international market conditions to affect the relative frequency of regimes over the years. Thus, while we find relatively few manage floats during the tranquil early years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , the degree of intervention jumps dramatically in 1994 and 1995.
A substantial body of literature has discussed whether in the context of increasing capital mobility the sustainability of managed exchange rate regimes was becoming more and more difficult. This point, stressed by Eichengreen (1994) , and referred to as the "hollowing out hypothesis", has also been addressed by Frankel (1999) and Cohen (1999) . Table 4a and 4b gives us some indication as to whether the hollowing out hypothesis holds true in our sample: As can be seen from the tables there is no indication of a gradual disappearance of intermediate regimes. Even though the methodology allows for a change in the number of cases belonging to each group every year, we find no apparent pattern supporting the "hollowing out hypothesis" in the data. 16 The discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper and certainly deserves a careful econometric analysis.
A comparison with the IFS classification
Tables A3.1 through A3.9 presented in the Appendix 3 compare our classification with the standard de jure classification used by the IMF. 17 As expected, there is a high degree of coincidence between both classifications, but also a substantial number of mismatches. Table 5 provides a first pass at the nature of the discrepancies. Excluding 2 nd round inconclusives, which are not assigned to any particular regime, we compute the count the number of countries which claim to be fixers but which show substantial movement in their exchange rates, and those countries which claim to be floaters but which actively intervene in exchange rate markets. 18 The number of countries which seem not to follow their word seems to have declined from about 30% at the beginning of the sample to about 20% towards the end. While there seems to be an increased consistency between what is said and what is done, the pattern is by no means monotonic throughout the sample period.
Looking more carefully at the tables presented in the Appendix, one can clearly identify the sources of discrepancies. Fixers which do not fix correspond to countries with occasional devaluations including the CFA countries in 1994 and Spain after 1992. Venezuela and Nepal also appear occasionally in this category.
Conversely, many countries that claimed to run a floating rate displayed little exchange rate volatility coupled with intense foreign exchange market intervention, so that in reality they are closer to a fix exchange rate regime. Brazil and New Zealand appear occasionally in this group as well as some Scandinavian economies like Norway, Finland and Sweden.
An informal test of the theory
An additional test for the validity of our classification is to track, for particular countries, the regime that follows from the new classification. Table 14 shows for selected countries the result of our classification. As can be seen from the Table, the developed economies within the first group have consistently sustained a pure float. Indeed, the fact that the regime is identified as float in the 1 st round indicates that these countries have allowed for a non-negligible degree of volatility in the exchange rate.
For the emerging economies in this sample the results look different. Here market intervention is more pervasive. As expected for high inflation countries, the Dirty/CP classification appears to be the most common. There are exceptions, however: Argentina maintained a fixed rate since 1992, and both Mexico and Chile allow for pure floats.
Western European economies also show different patterns. Whereas towards the end, exchange rate stability prevailed (with the exception of Italy), in the interim we find divergent results. Denmark, for example, which has remained out of the EMU, has been consistently linked to the deutsche marc. Similarly, France has intervened actively to keep its parity in line with the marc. On the other hand, Italy allowed its currency to float in the aftermath of the British devaluation of 1992.
For small open economies the common pattern has been to fix their exchange rates to the currencies of its main partner(s), something to be expected given their rather limited range for an independent monetary policy. 19 However, we also find countries with relatively little intervention, which are therefore classified in the irrelevant category.
Interest rate policy
An important question related to our facts-based approach is the role played by the interest rate policy, a dimension that we ignored in our classification procedure.
20 It could be argued that in some cases interest rates, instead of reserves, are used to equilibrate the exchange rate market, a practice that could potentially defeat the purpose of this classification by identifying as free floaters countries that actively intervene to stabilize the exchange rate. Although this represents a legitimate argument, several reasons move us to leave interest rate out of the classification process.
First, we believe that the scope for interest rate policy to alter exchange market conditions without a concomitant movement in reserves is quite limited, both in duration and strength, as indicated by the success of most of the speculative attack episodes during our sample period.
But even if this were not the case, whether a positive correlation between interest rates and market pressure should be directly associated with a fix or dirty exchange rate regime is not obvious. While it is true that countries tend to use interest rate policy to stabilize the nominal exchange rate, this may be regarded just as an example of the active use of monetary policy, which is perfectly in line with the textbook definition of a flexible rate regime. Indeed, it is easy to see that a policy that targets inflation can induce exactly the same type of behavior, making it extremely difficult to disentangle whether the interest rate hike is due to "fear of floating" 21 , or whether it is counteracting the inflationary effect of a depreciation.
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Hausmann (1999) provides a useful illustration of the point, by contrasting the evidence from Australia and Mexico. Australia lowered interest rates at the beginning of the Asian crisis, easing monetary policy to compensate for the deflationary effects of the crisis and allowing the local currency to depreciate. Mexico, on the other hand, tightened monetary conditions in early 1998 when it faced increased exchange rate pressure. As a result, the correlation between exchange rate and interest rate changes is positive in the latter and negative in the former. 23 However, according to our classification both countries are labeled as floaters, which is consistent with the fact that they are both using monetary policy independently in order to affect the behavior of the nominal exchange rate. Should Mexico be classified as a dirty float? One is tempted to think that the negative consequences of an abrupt depreciation (of which inflation is only one) was in the mind of the Mexican authorities while deciding their interest rate policy. However, we should note that Canada, a country that, like Mexico, has an inflation target, displayed the same positive correlation at the time.
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Final Remarks
Having a proper exchange rate regime classification is essential for a proper understanding of the implications of choosing different exchange rate regimes. This paper generates what we believe is a more meaningful classification of exchange rate regimes than that so far used in empirical work, and is a necessary first step for research in the area.
The main contribution of the paper is to present, for the first time, an exchange rate regime classification entirely based on facts rather than on legal characteristic of the regime. Moreover, our approach highlights the importance of distinguishing between low and high variability countries to better analyze the link between regimes and other macroeconomic variables. Although some basic characteristics already emerged from simple inspection of the classification, only future empirical research will reveal whether this new classification proves useful to understand the implications of different exchange rate regimes. Future work should also explore the possibility of using a similar approach to build from the data a quantitative indicator of the relative fixedness of exchange rate regimes.
24 Canada is also a float according to our index. 25 We do not intend to close the discussion here. Rather, we prefer to suggest that an alternative classification could be conceived that assigns regimes according to the (non-observable) targets of the monetary authorities. There, both Canada and (particularly) Mexico would be deemed managed floats, as will be any country that keep exchange rate in check to limit inflationary pressures. However, the previous discussion indicates the non trivial problems involved in defining classification variables that accurately capture the latent objective function of the central bank. (2) Float (2) Float (2) Float (2) Float (2) Float (2) Float (2) Float (2) 
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